Intra-Process Sandboxing for the IoT
IoT application developers rely very heavily on third-party libraries to reduce development time and effort. Despite their best effort, developers may still unintentionally include malicious third-party code, which may attempt to leak private sensor data to an unintended remote server. To address this problem, we are designing a new in-kernel sandbox that controls access to system resources at the granularity of libraries without running them in separate processes. More specifically, whenever an IoT application attempts to access a system resource, our sandbox enforces a developer-supplied library access policy for that resource. Using the application runtime's current callstack as the context for the access, our sandbox determines whether to allow the access according to the permissions given to the libraries found in the callstack.
To effectively solve this problem, we must also overcome a few other challenges. (1) In order to ensure the validity of access control decisions, we must protect the integrity of the runtime callstack against potentially malicious libraries that may tamper with the runtime's memory. This requires isolating the runtime's core memory from the application's and libraries' memories. (2) Dynamic language features and mechanisms such as reflection, multi-threading, and asynchronous operations, may change the application runtime's callstack dynamically. Our callstack-based access control system must therefore be able to determine the correct permissions for the current resource access context in the face of such dynamic features to guarantee valid access control decisions.
Stormship: Detecting Malicious Script Injections in Web Pages
There are many parties and organizations that can see which websites we visit, because they sit on the path between web clients, and the web servers hosting the sites we request. For instance, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are responsible for transmitting our web traffic, but reports have shown that they may also inject ads into users’ requested web pages to increase revenue. Other parties such as CDNs, enterprise software, client-side software, and even malicious adversaries, may also intercept our web traffic for a wide variety of reasons. Thus, we aim to study in-flight web page modifications today, and to develop a browser-side tool that detects malicious web page modifications automatically.
In a preliminary measurement study, we have found that page properties such as the number of scripts included in a web page HTML source vary greatly between different geographic locations. Our next step is to more closely characterize the changes made to web pages in-transit between the server and browser. To this end, we are conducting a second measurement study that will help us determine what types of modifications are made to web pages in-flight and which on-path parties are responsible for making these modifications. With the results of these two studies, we will build a browser-side tool that can automatically classify whether detected web page modifications are of malicious nature, and warn the user.
CONIKS: Key Transparency for End Users
In recent years, online communication service providers have developed new applications that have brought end-to-end encrypted communications to the masses with an excellent user experience. However, these services must make an important trade-off between added security and usability: They must either entirely manage their users' encryption keys on their behalf making them vulnerable to key server compromise and MITM attacks, or leave key management to the users and ask them to verify each other's keys themselves. Unfortunately, despite new techniques that have made manual key verification more user-friendly, the vast majority of users still do not take these steps to guarantee the security of their communications.
To address this problem, we designed CONIKS, a key management system for end users that improves the security and privacy of end-to-end secure communication services. By having communication service providers maintain tamper-evident and publicly auditable key directories on behalf of their users, CONIKS allows secure communication clients to verify users' keys automatically so users do not have to worry about the underlying encryption or trust their service provider to be well-behaved.
As a Master's student and undergraduate, I also worked on several prior projects.